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temporal context at encoding) and retrieval of information that was 
contextually sensitive. He argued in contrast that habit learning was 
similar to the stimulus–response (S–R) learning processes proposed 
by earlier learning researchers, and that these S–R associations were 
specifically insensitive to context.
Miskin et al. (1984) extended Hirsch’s concept of habit learn-
ing. Following Hirsch, they identified features of habit learning 
as the opposite those of hippocampally-based learning. One set 
of features was “rapid” versus “slow” learning. Rapid learning was 
defined as one-trial learning, which required the hippocampus, 
whereas slow learning required repeated trials and was preserved in 
amnesia. They immediately related the “rapid”–“slow” distinction 
to the distinction posed by Hirsh, which they referred to as flexible 
(contextually sensitive in Hirsh) versus inflexible learning. They 
proposed that there is “a trade-off between short-term flexibility 
afforded by the memory system and long-term reliability afforded 
by the habit system” (p. 73). Finally, they argued that habits were a 
relatively primitive form of learning that should therefore appear 
earlier in ontogeny as well as phylogeny, which they supported with 
developmental evidence from their lab.
Mishkin and colleagues were also the first to propose a crucial 
role for the basal ganglia in habit learning. The basis for their argu-
ment, which they termed “admittedly speculative” was the early 
development of the basal ganglia both in phylogeny and ontog-
eny, and the presence of widespread anatomical projections to the 
striatum from cortex that “provide a mechanism through which 
cortically processed sensory inputs could become associated with 
motor outputs generated in the pallidum and so yield the  stimulus–
response bonds that constitute habits” (p. 74).
Cognitive PsyChology: habit as imPliCit and automatiC
The field of cognitive psychology did not use the term habit learn-
ing, but from the late 1960s through the 1980s several concepts 
were developed in this field that later were incorporated into theo-
ries of habit learning. These distinctions included unconscious, 
introduCtion
The concept of habit learning has developed through the fruitful 
interaction of researchers in several intellectual domains, including 
animal learning, cognitive psychology, cognitive neuropsychology, 
and behavioral neuroscience. As a result, habit learning has taken 
on a variety of proposed definitions. In this paper, we will first 
describe the historical evolution of habit learning as a concept. 
We will then briefly describe the anatomical and functional roles 
of the basal ganglia that may underlie learning in general and habit 
learning in particular. Finally, we will revisit the defining features 
of habit learning and assess how well they characterize learning in 
the basal ganglia.
historiCal evolution of the habit learning ConCePt
The term habit was used, but not explicitly defined, by William 
James in the seminal Principles of Psychology (James, 1890). It was 
used on occasion by early researchers studying animal learning, in 
particular Hull (1934a,b) and Lashley (1930, 1950). “Habit” roughly 
corresponded to the resulting motor behavior (e.g., Lashley referred 
to the “maze running habit”), and habit learning to acquisition of 
these behaviors in an instrumental learning context.
hiPPoCamPal researCh: early definitions of habit learning
The earliest use of “habit learning” to refer to a specific form of 
learning came from researchers studying the effects of hippocam-
pal damage in human and non-human animals. By the late 1960s 
it was clear that hippocampal damage affected learning on many, 
but not all, tasks. Hirsh (1974) first used the term “habit learning” 
to describe a particular type of memory or learning system. He 
defined the habit system as that “responsible for the learning of 
which hippocampally ablated animals are capable” (1974, p 421). 
Thus, from the beginning habit learning was defined negatively, in 
terms of what it was not (i.e., hippocampally based), rather than 
what it was. To Hirsch, the primary feature of hippocampal-based 
learning was contextual encoding (e.g., of the particular spatial and 
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or explicit learning and memory), and automatic processing (in 
contrast with controlled processing). Both of these distinctions 
fall broadly within “dual process” theories of cognition that see 
one type of cognitive process as relatively unconscious, automatic, 
evolutionarily early, and similar across individuals, in contrast with 
a second type of cognitive process that is conscious, controlled, 
evolutionarily more recent, and subject to significant individual 
differences (see Evans, 2008 for a review).
Reber (1967) coined the term “implicit learning”; the concept 
was extended to “implicit memory” by Graf and Schacter (1985). 
The focus in both areas of research was on consciousness: identify-
ing what could or could not be learned and/or retrieved without 
awareness. Implicit memory was defined as “when previous experi-
ences facilitate performance on a task that does not require con-
scious or intentional recollection of those experiences” (Schacter, 
1987, p. 501). Implicit memory tasks typically used priming para-
digms in which improvement in accuracy and/or processing time 
was observed for repeated stimuli; priming was later divided into 
perceptual (repeated visual stimulus processing) and conceptual 
(repeated semantic processing) forms (Keane et al., 1991).
Seger (1994, p. 164) outlined three guidelines for implicit learn-
ing: (1) “the knowledge gained in implicit learning is not fully 
accessible to consciousness, in that subjects cannot provide a full 
… verbal account of what they have learned,” (2) “information 
[learned] … is more complex than a single simple association or fre-
quency count,” and (3) “implicit learning does not involve processes 
of conscious hypothesis testing but is an incidental consequence 
of the type and amount of cognitive processing performed on the 
stimuli.” Implicit learning was studied using several different tasks, 
most often the serial reaction time task (which measures improve-
ment in reaction time when responding to stimuli when presented 
in a repeating sequence in comparison with stimuli presented in 
random order), and the artificial grammar task (which measures 
the ability of subjects to discriminate letter strings that follow a 
complex sequential pattern determined by a finite state automaton, 
or artificial grammar, from those that violate the pattern).
Another influential concept from cognitive psychology was that 
of automaticity, originally developed by Shiffrin and Schneider 
(1977) to account for different forms of attentional scanning. 
The concepts of automatic and controlled processing were widely 
adopted across various domains within cognitive psychology. 
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) gave multiple criteria for consider-
ing a process to be automatic, including (1) automatic processes 
are not constrained by short-term memory capacity limitations 
and do not require attention; (2) automatic processes are gener-
ally performed too quickly to be consciously accessible and once 
initiated are completed regardless of subjects’ intentions; (3) auto-
matic processes require significant training, undergoing a gradual 
shift from controlled to automatic through the course of practice; 
and (4) automatic processes, once acquired, are difficult to modify. 
Criterion 1 led to an operational definition of automaticity as pri-
mary task performance not negatively affected by a parallel, short-
term memory demanding task.
Through development of the process dissociation procedure, 
Jacoby (1991) related automaticity to implicit learning and mem-
ory. He argued that participants should be able to exert strategic 
control over conscious knowledge, and theorized that they should 
be able to control the behavioral expression of this knowledge in 
accordance with task instructions. Conversely, he argued that par-
ticipants should be unable exert strategic control over unconscious 
knowledge and theorized that they might have difficulty controlling 
the behavioral expression of this knowledge. The critical feature 
of the process dissociation procedure is that participants are asked 
to demonstrate knowledge via both “inclusion” and “exclusion” 
instructions. Inclusion instructions demand that participants 
produce behavior in accordance with a learned structure, while 
exclusion instructions demand that participants produce discord-
ant behavior. This approach led to a different operational definition 
of automaticity. Automatic processing is measured by calculating 
the intrusion of the previously learned material into the exclusion 
condition (false positives); controlled processing is defined as the 
difference between performance in the inclusion condition and the 
automatic processing measure.
Cognitive neuroPsyChology: habit as a tyPe of “non-
deClarative” memory
Larry Squire and colleagues integrated the approaches taken by 
researchers examining hippocampal lesions in non-human ani-
mals, researchers in cognitive psychology, and researchers studying 
human patients with amnesia. Their theory developed across time. 
Cohen and Squire (1980) initially defined procedural learning as 
“operations governed by rules or procedures” in contrast to hip-
pocampally based learning, which they characterized as “opera-
tions that depend on specific, declarative, data-based material.” The 
term “procedural” was adapted from artificial intelligence research 
(Winograd, 1972; Anderson, 1982). Anderson’s (1982) view was 
that all cognitive knowledge started by being represented declara-
tively, as individual “propositions,” and procedural knowledge was 
formed by the compilation of groups of propositions into proce-
dures. Procedural knowledge accounted well for the tasks known 
to be preserved in amnesia at that time, including pursuit rotor 
(Corkin, 1968), mirror drawing (Milner, 1962), and mirror reading 
(Cohen and Squire, 1980).
During the 1980s and early 1990s amnesic subjects were shown 
to have intact learning across a large number of novel tasks, pri-
marily drawn from the implicit memory and learning literatures. 
These included perceptual priming (Graf and Schacter, 1985), the 
serial reaction time task (Nissen and Bullemer, 1987), artificial 
grammar learning (Knowlton et al., 1992), category learning using 
the Posner dot pattern task (Knowlton and Squire, 1993), and some 
aspects of learning on the Tower of Hanoi task (Cohen, 1984). It 
soon became clear that the term “procedural” was insufficient to 
characterize all the different types of non-hippocampal learning 
and memory. Squire and Zola-Morgan (1988) created the term 
“non-declarative” and defined it as “a heterogeneous collection of 
abilities: motor skills, perceptual skills, and cognitive skills (these 
abilities and perhaps others are examples of procedural memory); 
as well as simple classical conditioning, adaptation level effects, 
priming, and other instances where experience alters performance 
independently of providing a basis for the conscious recollection of 
past events” (p. 171). Non-declarative memory thus incorporated 
the cognitive psychology distinction between implicit and explicit 
memory with the result that   hippocampal-based   declarative 
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routine” (Graybiel, 2008, p. 361). Like Squire’s approach to non-
declarative memory, Graybiel’s definition brings together several 
features from previous work, including that habits are relatively 
automatic, and unconscious, and that habits can be inflexible and 
rigid (particularly well learned habits). Graybiel emphasizes two 
additional features of habit: first, that motor habits are sequential 
behaviors with complex structure, going beyond a simple concept 
of a “response,” and second, that habits can extend beyond motor 
behaviors to include cognitive processes.
the basal ganglia and learning
The basal ganglia are a group of subcortical nuclei, including the 
striatum, globus pallidus, substantia nigra, and subthalamic nucleus 
in humans. The basal ganglia interact with cerebral cortex via cor-
ticostriatal loops, in which information projects from cortex to the 
striatum, to the basal ganglia output nuclei, to the thalamus, and 
from there back to cortex (Alexander et al., 1986; Seger, 2008). The 
functions of the basal ganglia are supported by three pathways 
from the striatum to the thalamus, termed the “direct,” “indirect,” 
and “hyperdirect” pathways (Frank, 2005; Cohen and Frank, 2009). 
Broadly, the three pathways together implement a balance between 
regulating tonic inhibition in cortex as well as selective activation 
or gating of particular representations. The representations that 
the basal ganglia act upon is determined by the region of cortex 
within each corticostriatal loop. Although projections are continu-
ous and there are no firm dividing lines between loops, it is useful 
for practical purposes to identify functionally different loops. Our 
approach includes four distinct loops (Seger and Cincotta, 2005; 
Seger, 2008) and is illustrated in Figure 2. They are the motor loop, 
  learning was now identified as memory that was accessible to 
consciousness, and the heterogeneous non-declarative memory 
systems as unconscious.
Squire and Zola-Morgan (1988, 1991) developed what was to 
become an often reprinted figure illustrating the types and subtypes 
of declarative and non-declarative memory (the 1991 version is 
shown in Figure 1). In Squire and Zola-Morgan (1988) the term 
“habit” isn’t used; instead, several different “skills” are described 
including motor skills (pursuit motor, Corkin, 1968; serial reaction 
time, Nissen and Bullemer, 1987; mirror drawing Milner, 1962), 
perceptual skills (mirror reading; Cohen and Squire, 1980), and cog-
nitive skills (Tower of Hanoi; Cohen, 1984. Hebb digits task: Brooks 
and Baddeley, 1976). By 1991, Squire and colleagues referred to this 
type of non-declarative memory as “skills and habits,” as shown in 
Figure 1. They noted the basal ganglia as one potential neural system 
involved in habits and skills, along with the cerebellum.
animal learning: habit learning as one form of instrumental 
Conditioning
In the 1980s, Dickinson (1985) proposed separate “goal-directed 
behavior” and “habit” instrumental learning systems, based on 
whether execution of the learned behavior is sensitive to the value 
of the reward or not, respectively. One typical manipulation is to 
devalue the reinforcer by satiating the animal before testing; the value 
of a food reward is greater when the animal is hungry than when it 
has recently fed. An animal will perform a habitual act to obtain food 
even when it has eaten to satiation. He contrasted habit with goal-
directed behavior, which is sensitive to the motivational state of the 
animal. Subsequent neuroscience studies (Yin and Knowlton, 2006; 
Packard, 2009) found that the distinction between goal-directed and 
habitual learning corresponded with reliance on different parts of 
the basal ganglia: the dorsomedial rodent striatum (homologous to 
the primate anterior caudate nucleus), and the dorsolateral striatum 
(homologous to the primate posterior putamen) respectively.
Graybiel (2008) recently offered a broad definition of habit 
learning. “First, habits (mannerisms, customs, rituals) are largely 
learned; in current terminology, they are acquired via experience-
dependent plasticity. Second, habitual behaviors occur repeatedly 
over the course of days or years, and they can become remarkably 
fixed. Third, fully acquired habits are performed almost automati-
cally, virtually non-consciously, allowing attention to be focused 
elsewhere. Fourth, habits tend to involve an ordered, structured 
action sequence that is prone to being elicited by a particular context 
or stimulus. And finally, habits can comprise cognitive  expressions 
Figure 1 | The fractionation of long-term memory proposed by Squire 
and Zola-Morgan. Redrawn based on Squire and Zola-Morgan (1991). Figure 2 | Corticostriatal loops.
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of non-declarative memory. Habit learning was independently 
characterized as inflexible by Dickinson (1985), who defined 
inflexibility in contrast to goal oriented behaviors, later shown 
to rely on prefrontal and dorsomedial striatal systems (Yin and 
Knowlton, 2006).
Flexible or inflexible has not been formally defined. The work-
ing definitions of these terms differ depending on whether habit 
learning is contrast with the hippocampal or prefrontal system. 
Within the hippocampal system, flexibility is often thought to be a 
consequence of individual memories formed by the hippocampus 
that can be applied to new situations. A commonly task thought 
to require hippocampally mediated flexibility is transitive infer-
ence, in which subjects are taught a set of ordinal relations, e.g., 
A > B, B > C, and then tested on whether they can infere that A > C 
(Eichenbaum and Fortin, 2009). Some researchers have argued 
that the basal ganglia are limited to learning the individual ordinal 
relations and cannot support transitive inference or related phe-
nomena (Myers et al., 2003; Shohamy et al., 2006). However, other 
research has found an opposite pattern of results, in which transi-
tive inference relies on corticostriatal dopaminergic systems and 
is actually enhanced when the hippocampus is inhibited (Frank 
et al., 2003). Similar findings of hippocampal independence on 
other tasks thought to reflect flexibility (e.g., novelty transfer, 
Driscoll et al., 2004) indicate that this concept needs to be reas-
sessed. Research is currently underway in a number of labs to 
better characterize what specific computational roles are played in 
inference tasks (Moustafa et al., 2010; Shohamy and Adcock, 2010).
Habit learning “inflexibility” is also defined in contrast with 
the sorts of flexibility enabled by executive functions subserved by 
the prefrontal cortex. In fact, executive functions were originally 
defined in clinical neuroscience as the ability to deal with novel or 
non-routine situations (Shallice, 1982). Prefrontal cortex enables 
flexible behavior through a variety of mechanisms involved in plan-
ning (setting goals, hypothesis formation, and testing), working 
memory (holding information online for several seconds), and 
cognitive control (the ability to execute plans in the face of distrac-
tions or other forms of interference; O’Reilly et al., 2010). Some 
have argued that the basal ganglia implement an inflexible learning 
process limited to past experience which then interacts with the 
flexible representations in prefrontal cortex.
Daw et al. (2005) argue that the basal ganglia select behaviors 
on the basis of the previous history of reinforcement, whereas the 
prefrontal cortex enables “model-based” control based on theo-
ries or strategies. Activity in the basal ganglia can be predicted by 
measures taken from reinforcement-learning modeling, specifically 
reward prediction (the estimate of the expected reward associated 
with choosing a particular behavior in the current state) and reward 
prediction error (the difference between the predicted and actually 
received reward). In this sense, the basal ganglia is inflexible because 
it is constrained to act in accordance with past reinforcement his-
tory. However, some studies have found patterns of basal ganglia 
activity that cannot be completely accounted for by reinforcement-
learning models (Lopez-Paniagua and Seger, 2011).
One limitation of reinforcement-learning models is that they 
model the environment as a finite set of repeating states. In real-
ity, organisms face situations that vary continuously, and need 
which connects motor and premotor cortexes with the putamen; 
the executive loop, which connects lateral and medial prefrontal 
regions with the anterior caudate; the visual loop, which connects 
inferior temporal regions with the posterior caudate, and the moti-
vational loop, which connects ventromedial prefrontal regions with 
the ventral striatum (including the nucleus accumbens and ventral 
caudate and putamen). Given the broad patterns of cortical projec-
tions to the basal ganglia, it is not surprising that the basal ganglia 
are associated with a large variety of functions, including motor 
control (Redgrave et al., 2010), cognitive coordination (Stocco et al., 
2010), and emotional functions (Nakano et al., 2000).
The basal ganglia are involved in learning through a variety of 
inherent plasticity mechanisms. The best studied is N-Methyl-d-
aspartate (NMDA) modulated long-term potentiation (LTP) at the 
corticostriatal synapse. Corticostriatal synapses also receive dopa-
minergic input and LTP is highly sensitive to the presence of dopa-
mine (Pawlak and Kerr, 2008). Dopamine projections come from 
the midbrain, including the ventral tegmental area and portions of 
the substantia nigra. Some dopamine neuron activity is sensitive to 
reward expectation and is computationally well-described by reward 
prediction error (Schultz, 2002; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). This 
dopamine signal is well-suited to serve as a learning signal indicating 
the presence of unexpected rewards, thus the organism is more likely 
to repeat the behavior leading to the reward in the future.
The basal ganglia are particularly important in learning the 
relationship between sensory information and motor responses 
on the basis of trial by trial feedback (Seger, 2008; Shohamy et al., 
2008). Computational models of dopamine-mediated plasticity 
within the direct pathway (Ashby and Ennis, 2006), and across 
pathways (Frank, 2005; Cohen and Frank, 2009) do an excellent job 
of accounting for learning in this type of task. Convergent evidence 
from a variety of species and techniques supports the view that 
the basal ganglia are critical for learning in these tasks (Yin and 
Knowlton, 2006; Graybiel, 2008; Balleine et al., 2009; Packard, 2009; 
Seger, 2009). Most habit learning tasks follow the same stimulus–
response–reward/feedback task structure (Seger, 2009), and thus it 
is reasonable to propose that the basal ganglia should be important 
in habit learning.
reassessment of habit learning’s defining 
CharaCteristiCs
As the concept of habit learning developed, a number of differ-
ent defining features were proposed. The following features were 
most commonly cited: inflexible, slow, unconscious, automatic, and 
insensitive to reinforcer devaluation. Here we revisit each of these 
defining criteria, asking the following questions about each: Why 
was it proposed? How precisely is it defined, and are there differ-
ent definitions in use in different research areas? How accurately 
does this feature describe basal ganglia related learning? And, if 
relevant, how practical is the criterion for use with both human 
and non-human animals?
inflexible
The characterization of habit learning as “inflexible” comes from 
Hirsh (1974), in contrast with flexible, context-dependent learn-
ing that was subserved by the hippocampus. Miskin et al. (1984) 
also included inflexible in their definition of habit learning, as 
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will depend on the operational definition of slow. However, it 
should be noted that basal ganglia dependent learning tasks vary 
greatly in how many trials it takes for subjects to reach maximal 
performance. Cromer et al. (2011) found that activity in the head 
of the caudate reached asymptote after five trials in a rule-learning 
paradigm. Delgado et al. (2005) found greatest caudate activity in 
an fMRI study during early learning (the first 8 repetitions of each 
stimulus) in comparison with later learning. Notably, these results 
are all from the caudate nucleus. Some researchers argue that the 
putamen should primarily subserve habitual learning. Studies that 
examine putamen activity during learning often find slower increases 
than in the caudate. However, activity levels in the putamen often 
follow behavior: activity reaches its maximum as behavioral accuracy 
reaches asymptote (Brasted and Wise, 2004; Williams and Eskandar, 
2006), or as reinforcement-learning measures of learning, e.g., reward 
prediction, reach their maximum (Seger et al., 2010). Regional dif-
ferences in learning speed are discussed further in the Conclusion.
If habit learning is acquired gradually, then when is performance 
fully habitual? Some people have argued that habits continue to 
develop even beyond the point at which behavioral measures cease 
to change, e.g., accuracy and reaction time reach their asymptotes. 
Grol et al. (2006) found continued practice related change in basal 
ganglia activity during these time points. Helie et al. (2010) and 
Waldschmidt and Ashby (2011) examined learning related changes 
long past the point at which accuracy reached asymptote, and 
found that basal ganglia activity continued to change and ulti-
mately decreased to baseline levels. A more formal computational 
approach to measuring learning rates would be particularly helpful 
in this regard, as well as theories that can account for different levels 
of expertise and their neural correlates.
unConsCious
Unconsciousness, as a defining feature of habit learning, stems 
from the inclusion of habit learning as a subtype of non-declarative 
memory by Squire and Zola-Morgan (1988, 1991). In their theory, 
declarative memory was accessible to consciousness, whereas non-
declarative memory was not.
Consciousness can be difficult to define both on a practical and 
theoretical level. It is difficult to assess the degree of conscious 
access to knowledge in non-human animals, and impossible to 
assess verbalizable knowledge. Even with humans, there is debate 
about which measures of awareness are best for assessing whether 
there is conscious access to knowledge or not (Seth et al., 2008). 
Assessing awareness during task performance can affect the  subject’s 
strategic approach to the task, whereas assessing awareness after a 
task can easily miss information that might have been accessible 
to awareness during performance. On a more theoretical level, it is 
not always clear whether the relationship between awareness and 
learning is a necessary one; one logical possibility is that aware-
ness is epiphenomenal and does not play a causal role in learning.
Recent research has found that the basal ganglia are involved 
in a wide variety of learning tasks, both ones in which learning is 
inaccessible to consciousness (Pessiglione et al., 2008), and in tasks 
in which subjects are aware of what they have learned, such as rule-
learning tasks, arbitrary visuomotor learning tasks, and simple 
unstructured categorization tasks (Seger et al., 2011). Basal ganglia 
to be able to generalize to similar but not identical situations. 
The basal ganglia are active in categorization tasks that require 
generalization to related, but novel, stimuli, indicating at least 
some flexibility (for review of some possible mechanisms, see 
Seger, 2008). It is unclear what the limits are to generalization 
in habit learning, and what role the basal ganglia may play in 
generalization.
slow or inCremental
Habit learning was first characterized as slow or incremental 
by Miskin et al. (1984). As with “inflexible,” this criterion was 
defined on the basis of learning in hippocampally ablated animals, 
in which learning required multiple trials. In contrast, animals 
with an intact hippocampus can show one-trial learning. The 
terms “slow” and “incremental” are often interpreted as requiring 
hundreds or thousands of trials, but this is not well established. 
Standard approaches from cognitive psychology involve examin-
ing learning curves for accuracy and reaction time, and poten-
tially then habit learning can be thought to be complete when 
asymptote is achieved (see Figure 3, bottom section). Attempts 
to formalize learning rates come from reinforcement learning 
and state space modeling approaches. Reinforcement-learning 
approaches result in two common measures: reward prediction 
error, which is the measure of how unexpected the received reward 
is, and value, which is the expected reward associated with the cur-
rent stimulus and associated action. When learning is the fastest, 
RPE is the highest and value rapidly changes. As a task is learned, 
RPE reduces to zero and value asymptotes toward its maximum 
(Figure 3, middle section).
Figure 3 | Comparison of various possible criteria for habit learning that 
develop across learning on the basis of approximate point in training at 
which learning becomes habitual. Note that only criteria that can develop 
across training are included; criteria that are required across the entire time 
course of learning (unconscious, inflexible) are not. Top section: Qualitative 
criteria including two operational definitions of automaticity, and reinforcer 
devaluation. Middle and Bottom section: possible operational definitions of slow 
or incremental. Middle: Criteria based on computational modeling. This 
approach is illustrated using reinforcement-learning measures (reward 
prediction error, and value, or reward prediction) although other approaches can 
also be used. Bottom: Commonly used simple behavioral measures of learning.
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that an automatic process will be performed regardless of a person’s 
intentions, and thus will affect performance on a task even when 
the subject is attempting to not be affected (an exclusion task in 
Jacoby’s terminology). This operational definition has not often 
been used in examining the basal ganglia in habit learning, though 
some researchers studying motor sequence learning have found 
that the striatum is recruited during automatic performance and is 
affected by prefrontal cortical mechanisms when subjects attempt 
to suppress the automatic performance (Destrebecqz et al., 2005).
reinforCer revaluation insensitivity
The requirement that habit learning be insensitive to reinforcer 
revaluation comes from the field of animal learning. It has the 
advantage of being well defined, and it is clear how to apply this 
criterion experimentally, at least with non-human animal subjects. 
It is also clear how this criterion relates to learning in basal ganglia 
dependent tasks. This criterion dissociates the dorsomedial from 
dorsolateral striatum, with only the latter involved in habitual 
action.
The criterion does have some practical disadvantages. It requires 
two manipulations: first, the subject’s value for the reinforcer 
must be changed (typically via feeding to satiation), and second, 
the behavior must be tested under conditions of extinction. It is 
unclear how effectively this procedure can be used with human 
subjects, who are more likely to notice that they are no longer being 
rewarded and change their behavior strategically (though some 
studies with humans have been published; Valentin et al., 2007). 
Second, it is unclear how the shift to reinforcer value independence 
corresponds to other meaningful transitions in the development 
of expertise, such as reaching asymptotic behavioral performance, 
or the emergence of dual task independence (Ashby et al., 2010; 
see also Figure 3).
ConClusion
As surveyed above, no single defining feature completely captures 
all the commonly-held beliefs about habit learning. Furthermore, 
the combination of these features are not always compatible. For 
example, the criterion of reinforcer devaluation and dual task 
independence each imply that learning should be considered 
habitual at a different point in training. We draw three main 
conclusions from our examination of habit learning and the basal 
ganglia. First, we provide a taxonomy of criteria for habit learning 
and divide them into two primary classes. Second, we examine 
patterns within the different corticostriatal loops and argue that 
the loops differ in the degree to which they meet criteria for habit 
learning, with the motor loop qualifying on more criteria than 
the executive loop. Third, we argue that the basal ganglia and 
corticostriatal systems interact with other neural systems and 
therefore that habit learning should not be assumed to exclusively 
require the basal ganglia, and describe some ways that these sys-
tems may interact.
The criteria for habit learning discussed above fall into two 
types. One type are criteria that can apply at any stage of learning, 
early or late. In particular, the criteria that learning is uncon-
scious and inflexible were traditionally meant to characterize 
learning at all stages. Another type of criteria is based on the view 
recruitment is similar for relatively simple categorization tasks 
associated with high levels of verbalizable knowledge and more 
complex tasks associated with little verbalizable knowledge (Seger, 
2008). Thus, basal ganglia do not seem to be exclusively associ-
ated with either conscious or unconscious learning. Furthermore, 
in recent research consciousness has proved to be a less reliable 
sign of hippocampal involvement in memory. The hippocampus 
has been shown to be required in several implicit learning tasks. 
These include contextual cuing, in which subjects become faster at 
searching repeated stimulus arrays (Greene et al., 2007), and some 
sequential relationships in the serial reaction time task (Schendan 
et al., 2003; Ergorul and Eichenbaum, 2006; Wilkinson et al., 2009).
automatiC
The concept of automaticity was developed in cognitive psychology 
by Shiffrin and Schneider (1977). It is itself a complex concept with 
four main characteristics. Three of these characteristics have already 
been discussed as potential defining features of habit learning: that 
automatic performance is unconscious, that the knowledge applied 
automatically is rigid or inflexible, and that automatic processes are 
acquired slowly and incrementally. The remaining characteristic is 
that automatic processes do not require the limited capacity cog-
nitive mechanisms involved in short-term memory and selective 
attention. This leads to an operational definition that automatic 
tasks should be able to be performed in a dual task situation along 
with a demanding task that requires short-term memory and selec-
tive attention processes.
Although this definition is on the surface clear, in practice it 
is hard to know whether a particular dual task actually monopo-
lizes appropriate limited capacity cognitive mechanisms. Recently, 
the concept of controlled processing has undergone extensive 
revision; there is no longer support for a simple modal model 
of memory, with a single limited capacity short-term memory 
store, though evidence suggests there are some general purpose or 
shared resources (Lavie, 2010). The modern view of short-term, 
or working, memory, and executive function includes qualita-
tively different short-term stores for different materials (Linden, 
2007), and instead of a single attentional mechanism it includes 
a wide variety of cognitive control mechanisms (Banich et al., 
2009; Braver et al., 2009). Learning in basal ganglia dependent 
tasks is often less affected by dual tasks than comparison tasks 
(Zeithamova and Maddox, 2006).
Dual task independence is also problematic when considering 
whether the basal ganglia are involved in habit learning, because 
the basal ganglia are in addition important for executive functions 
involved in task switching and selection. Thus, in a dual task situ-
ation any basal ganglia activity could be due to demands on the 
basal ganglia for coordinating the dual tasks, rather than for either 
of the tasks individually (Poldrack et al., 2005). Nevertheless, some 
researchers have used dual task methodologies successfully, such 
as Foerde et al. (2006) who found greater reliance on the basal 
ganglia for classification learning during dual task conditions in 
comparison with single task conditions. Interestingly, they found 
greater reliance on the putamen during dual task learning, which 
raises the possibility that dual tasks may load some corticostriatal 
networks more than others.
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defined habit learning system with the neurally-defined basal 
ganglia system. Given the complexity of habit learning, it 
likely recruits a number of neural systems in healthy, intact 
organisms. Neuroimaging studies of skill and habit learning 
tasks typically find learning related plasticity in several neural 
systems (Poldrack and Gabrieli, 2001; Poldrack et al., 2005). 
Probably the most studied system is the medial temporal lobe. 
However, other neural systems such as the cerebellum have 
an effect on learning and interact with basal ganglia system 
(Doyon et al., 2009). Exactly how these systems interact during 
habit learning is an open area of research. One approach is to 
postulate that habit learning and other systems learn inde-
pendently and in parallel; the system that ultimately controls 
behavior is determined by competitive interactions between 
the systems (Ashby et al., 1998; Poldrack and Packard, 2003; 
Packard, 2009). Another approach assumes that initial learning 
is accomplished by a non-habit learning system, but that knowl-
edge is transferred to the habit system across training (Ashby 
et al., 2010). When the basal ganglia and hippocampus systems 
are examined, some experimental results find antagonism, some 
cooperation, and some complete independence (see Seger and 
Miller, 2010, for a review). Among researchers studying human 
learning, an emerging view is that the hippocampus is recruited 
the first time a stimulus is seen in order to set up a memory 
representation of that stimulus, and that the basal ganglia can 
then utilize this representation when learning relations between 
the stimulus and the response (Meeter et al., 2008; Shohamy 
et al., 2008; Seger et al., 2011). Between the basal ganglia and 
prefrontal systems, the traditional view that the basal ganglia 
subserves habit learning led initially to arguments that cortical 
activity should precede activity in the basal ganglia. However, 
that habit learning develops across time and emerges as learn-
ing progresses. There have been various behavioral hallmarks 
of learning that have been proposed. Figure 3 illustrates these 
hallmarks and indicates approximate points in time across train-
ing that they may be achieved. Broadly, behavioral landmarks 
can be divided into three subtypes. First, those based on simple 
analyses of behavior such as accuracy and reaction time, in which 
learning is defined as habitual when the measure reaches asymp-
tote, or when the task is “overlearned” via continued training 
past the point of asymptote. Second, those that apply computa-
tional modeling techniques to extract latent parameters thought 
to characterize learning. The most commonly used approach is 
from reinforcement learning, in which there are two relevant 
parameters: reward prediction error and value, or reward predic-
tion itself. Learning can be considered habitual when prediction 
error approaches zero, and reward prediction approaches asymp-
tote. Both simple behavioral and model-based approaches pro-
vide potential operational definitions for the criterion of “slow 
or incremental.” Third, qualitative criteria that are achieved at 
some point in learning. These include reinforcer devaluation 
insensitivity, automaticity defined as dual task insensitivity, and 
automaticity defined as inability to consciously control habitual 
knowledge. In addition, the field of motor learning suggests an 
additional possible criterion: the emergence of motor effector 
specificity. Across training, motor learning begins with relatively 
abstract representations that are accessible to multiple motor 
effectors, but learning become specific to the motor effector 
across training (Abrahamse et al., 2010).
The multiplicity, and at times incommensurability, of the dif-
ferent criteria for habit learning reinforces our belief that the field 
would benefit by moving towards more precise definitions of the 
various habit learning features. Formal mathematical or compu-
tational models will clarify exactly what is meant by slow and fast, 
flexible and inflexible learning and will allow for clear testable pre-
dictions. Formal models also have the advantage that they provide 
insight into potential underlying neural mechanisms; for example, 
reinforcement-learning modeling is particularly useful because it 
can be related to the firing patterns of dopaminergic neurons and 
the effects of dopamine on synaptic plasticity in the basal ganglia 
(Cohen and Frank, 2009; Moustafa and Gluck, 2011).
Another important lesson is that the basal ganglia is not a single 
unitary structure that is limited to a single cognitive domain. As 
described above, the basal ganglia and cortex interact in corticos-
triatal loops that implement different cognitive functions depend-
ing on the cortical regions involved. In Table 1 we summarize 
evidence for whether each corticostriatal loop meets criteria for 
being habitual. Broadly, regions participating in the motor loop 
(putamen and motor cortex) meet most criteria for habit learn-
ing, whereas regions participating in the visual loop are not well 
studied, and regions participating in the executive loop have a 
mixed pattern of results, meeting criteria for habit learning on 
some dimensions, but missing it on many more. The results sum-
marized in Table 1 broadly support arguments made by researchers 
studying rodents who argue that the putamen (rodent dorsolateral 
striatum) is the neural substrate for habit learning and that the 
caudate (dorsomedial striatum) is involved in non-habitual goal-
directed learning.
Table 1 | Habit learning criteria within dorsal corticostriatal loops.
Criterion  executive   Visual   Motor
QualiTaTiVe diFFereNCeS
Inflexible defined as reinforcement based1 Mixed  ?  Yes
Unconscious2  Mixed ?  Mixed
Automatic: dual task independent3  No  ? Yes
Automatic: PDP exclusion intrusions4 No  ?  Yes
Reinforcer devaluation5  No  ? Yes
Slow or iNCreMeNTal: CoMpuTaTioNal MeaSureS6
Reward prediction error  Strong  Weak  Weak
Value  Weak  Strong Strong
Slow or iNCreMeNTal: SiMple beHaVioral MeaSureS
Learning rate (slope)7  Strong  Weak Weak
Learning asymptote  Weak  Strong  Strong
Changes beyond asymptote8  Mixed ?  Yes
1Daw et al. (2005) and Lopez-Paniagua and Seger (2011).
2Seger et al. (2011) and Pessiglione et al. (2008).
3Poldrack et al. (2005), Foerde et al. (2006), and Waldmann and Ashby (2011).
4Destrebecqz et al. (2005).
5Balleine et al. (2009) and Yin and Knowlton (2006).
6Haruno and Kawato (2006) and Seger et al. (2010).
7Brasted and Wise, 2004, Williams and Eskandar (2006), and Seger et al. (2010).
8Grol et al. (2006), Helie et al. (2010, and Waldschmidt and Ashby (2011).
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